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Focus
the delay is related to the current situation in
Chechnya.
Mine action funding, mine clearance and mine
awareness are completely non-existent in the current
state of crisis in Chechnya. The few NGOs that have
operated there can only spend limited time in the
area. The ICRC withdrew after the assassination of
six workers in 1996. MERLIN, (Medical Emergency
Relief International) did distribute mine awareness
posters from 1996-1998, but withdrew later that
same year.
HALO Trust withdrew in December 1999.
HALO trust may have been one of the last NCO's
operating in Chechnya. When the fighting got too
severe for mine clearance work, HALO switched its
efforts to moving medical supplies between hospitals
and maintaining generators for the civilians. Recently,
when the Russians bombarded a mine fi eld that
HALO had been clearing, three of HALO's staff were
killed. "There are no distinctions between civilian
and military targets. If it moves they strike it with
aircraft, and if it does not move they shell it," says
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Amid the rumble ofdistant
explosions from Russian forces,
thousands of Chechens mllied
in the streets ofGrozny.
condemning the Russian
offensive, Oct. 14, 1999.
Phow c/o Associated Press I Ruslan
Masayev

HALO director Guy Willoughby. Man y feel that
HALO was doing instrumental work in Chechneya,
clearing mines and aiding in humanitarian relief efforts.
The Chechen civilians are caught in the middle
of the fighting. Many want to leave through the "safe"
corridors the Russians have provided. They can't trust
the roadways. There are numerous stories of the Russian soldiers demanding bribes and looting belongings
at checkpoints. "To the north are Russian guns, to the
south villages are being hit. They are afraid of becoming targets on both sides of this war," says Willoughby.
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Landmine casualties and victim assistance data
is not reliable. Estimates from the previous war site
800 casualties in 1996, half of which were children.
10 percent of children suffer from acute posttraumatic
stress disorders as a result oflandmine accidents. Victim assistance was nearly impossible prior to the cur-·
rent fighting. The health care system in Chechnya was
inadequate before the war because of severe shortages
of equipment, medicine and water. If medical care is
available, the victim must pay for any prosthesis and
crutches.
Social and econom ic problems were and will
continue to be staggering. Lack of financial support
from other countries, information blockades and the
absence of humanitarian relief are all devastating to
this tiny mountain country. Only a peace settlement
and mutual cooperation w ill allow humanitarian organizations to safely begin the seemingly insurmountable task of rebuilding the lives of the Chechen
people.
Currently, the situation for the Russian Rebels
is dire. While multiple rocket launchers are still being fired at Grozny, the brunt of the fighting has now
moved to the highlands, the last rebel strong hold.
Russian forces have launched an intensive military
attack in Alkhan-Kala village where their have been
many rebel casualties to include prominent rebel commanders.
Western military forces have asserted that the attack on Alkhan-Kala was an ambush. The Chechens
were lured there. The fighters were deliberately given
a "corridor" to escape Grozny. T his "corridor" was actually a mine field and several hundred rebel fighters
were killed when they entered it. The few dozen who
successfully crossed and reached Alkhan-Kala found
the Russians waiting for them.
At the beginning of the new millenium, Russia
is once again faced with defining its future, as it did
in the early 20th century. Former president Yeltsin,
chagrined by the comments of leaders in the European Union and the United States over the aggressive assault on Chechnya, has made the comment,
"They must have forgotten for a moment what Russia is. It has a full arsenal of nuclear weapons." This
may be so, bur there is also a rampant black market
operating, severe food shortages, and republics in their
federation breaking away from the motherland. While
none will dispute the need for a country to remain
strong, unified and prosperous, these are not the conditions of the current Russian Federation. •

Chai!Jmge in

Political controversy, economic chaos and increasing
criminality have faced Albania since its democratic
revolurion in late 1990. Anti-government demonstrations erupted into violence, which took the form of
attacks against state facilities including public offices,
schools, factories and military depots. Of particular
concern were the attacks against ammunition and
weapons storage areas. Over 600,000 weapons and
several thousand tons of ammunition and explosives
were looted and some 16 ammunition storage areas,
known as Hot Spots, were set ablaze resu lting in
massive unexploded ordnance contamination of the
sites and surrounding areas.

NATO Explosive Ordnance Disposal and
Storage Support
As part of irs commitment to democratic reform,
the government of Albania joined the North Atlantic Cooperatio n Council (NACC) in 1992 and was
one of the first co untries to join the Partnership for
Peace (PfP) program with the ultimate goal of NATO
membership. NACC sponsored expert teams that
undertook intensive assessment missions to Albania
in 1997 and 1998 concentrating on the following
ISSUes:

• National Security concept and democratic
control of the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF).
• Reorganization and functioning of the
Ministry of Defense, general staff, and
structure of the AAF.
• Development of a Command, Control, and
Communications Information (C==I) system.
• Assessments of the standards of basic military
infrastructure as well as defense planning and
budgeting.
• Sto rage and handling of ammunition, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and security
of military depots.

Ammunition Storage and Disposal
Implementation Team
The latter function was undertaken in late 1998
by an eight-man military Ammunition Storage and
Disposal Implementation Team (ASDIT) with members from the UK, United States, Denmark, Belgium
and Italy. They carried out the training of Conventional M un itions Disposal (CMD) of 16 Albanian
officers, the planning and cond uct ofUXO clearance
tasks, EOD clearance planning, p rovision of ammunition storage and management training for 14 officers. T hey also began training for the initial Ammunition Storage Area (ASA) safety, operational assessments, improved chemical analysis training and gave
advice to Albanian laboratory perso nnel.

EOD and Ammunition Storage Training Team
(EOD and ASTT)
The mission was successful, which provided the
AAF with the basic skills necessary to conduct operational tasks confidently. This mission also concluded
that further assistance was necessary to assist in the
establishment of a full concept of operations, signal
NATO's commitment ro capacity building and to
maintain momentum in resolving the problem. The
NATO Political Military Steering Committee
(PMSC) authorized the deployment of a second mission, the EOD and Ammunition Storage Training
Team (EODASTT) in early 1999.
The mission was unique in many ways because
a decision was taken to conrracr our the technical
nucleus of the team ro a commercial company by way
of competitive render. Mine Clear International, a
UK-based company specializing in EOD operations,
was selected and provided a team of two British and
one Canadian, former military Ammunition Technical Officers (ATO). The team was completed by serving military staff from Italy, the United States and
Denmark. Initially envisaged as a th ree-month mission, its success and immediate impact persuaded rhe
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PMSC to extend the mission incrementally unci! June
2000.

l)hm o c/o I-I ALO Trust

EODASTT Mission
Assembled from Ja n. 12 co Feb. I , 1999, the
second NATO mission's primary objective was "To
provide expert EOD and Ammunition Sco rage planning, assistance, training and advice co the Albanian
Ministry of Defense in order that the AAF can plan
and safely conduct EOD operations at Unexploded
Ordnance (UXO) contaminated sires, Logisti c Ammunition Disposal operations and the rationalization
and establishment of safe ammunitio n storage."
The mission goals for Explosive O rdnance Disposal was co assist the Ministry of D efense in forming an EOD organization, help in the productio n of
all procedures for the organization, assist in the planning of Hot Spot clearance, validating ammunition
disposal training, and procedures compliance are also
a priority. Preparation of a storage plan in conjunction with the Ministry of Defense was essential for
ammunition management as well as advising on the
establishment of Ammunition Scorage Areas (ASA)
co reflect NATO standards and no rms. Assisting in
identification, establishment, validation of Logistic
Disposal Operations (LDO), advice of demolition
grounds for LDO, and providing technical support
to a UK-funded demilitarization feasibility study was
critical to success.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal
This element of the mission, which is considered co be the most important by the Albanians, pro• 36 .

gressed smoothly. As of Dec. 15, 1999, many goals
had been mer such as, the establishment of the AAF
EOD organization managemenc ream, the provision
of sufficient EOD equipment dona ted by NATO
member-countries co equip current EOD teams, the
introduction of donated EOD equ ipment into service and training in use and deployment. All of these
goals were achieved as well as several more chat followed. More influential ones were the reconnaissance
of all 16 Hot Spots as well as the operation orders
and associated planning documentation was prepared
for each ind ividual Hot Spot. The H ot Spot at
Palikeshr was totally cleared of UXO and clearance
of a second Hot Spot at Mbresran was commenced.
All the low-level individual and collective training was
completed and the commencemenr of CMD instructors training began fo r all AAF personnel.
The program was d isrupted by the Kosovo crisis as AAF EO D resources, supported by EODASTT
technical in put, were re-tasked co deal with the
Serbian cross-border KB-1 sub-munitions, conventional artillery and mortar strikes in border areas.
Ocher areas char needed attention were the stray
NATO ai r-delivered weapons, the surveying and
marking of mined areas in Albania, and the clearing
of su pply routes and emergency mine clearance and
casualty recovery casks from mined areas.

Ammunition Management
This very complex area can only be successfully
achieved by a long-term program of assistance designed co develop a full technical ammunition management system. T here will be a need co develop an
external quantity d istance protection system in conjunction with national, regional and local authorities.
This will help develop health and safety practices
within ASA co NATO standards as well as accident
reponing, ammunition bans, technical data and ammunition hiscorical records. There is a need co design
new depots, control licensing and waivers on existing sires and develop a system to deal with concepcion, procurement, in service life and final disposal
of ammunitio n natures. A tracking system that
handles and earmarks war reserves, training issues and
has overall visibility of the stockpile is also a necessity.
A full set of ammunition techn ical regulations
would be an added benefit. The clear prerequisite co
future scorage planning was an ammunition program
based on AAF future operational and training requirements. A spreadsheet-based scaling document was
produced utilizing the NATO norm of 30 days gen-

era! war for operations and individual training requirements. T his document was carefully reviewed
in conjunction with the Albanian General Scaff co ensure char they understood the co ncept, the spreadsheet interaction a nd methodology, and chat base informacion o n the types of amm un ition and weapon
types could be validated. As of Dec. 15, 1999, they
had achieved full site surveys at 10 ASAs and completed full reporting on the findings, conclusions and
recommendations and chen passed on co AAF. A
PC-based ammunition management system was developed and submitted in draft form co the AAF and
eventually accepted. Finally, a development plan fo r
a model ASA at Borizane was commenced.

Logistic and Explosive Ordnance Disposal
It has been agreed that this area can be realistically addressed only as a two-stage operation wi th
stage one comprising logistics d isposal by demolition
and burning of that element of the stockpile which
is identified or suspected of being dangerous by the
AAF. Stage two would derai l the fab rication of a permanent demilitarization facility in Albania. Just nine
percent of the Albanian ammunition stockpile is less
than 30-years-old. It was determined chat as much
as 90 percent of the stockpile will require disposal
within the next 10 years, which is clearly a major
challenge for the AAF. The key ammunition requ iring logistical disposal is unopened ammunition in
poor conditi on (800+ cons) as well as stock declared
unserviceable by the AAF weighing up to as much
as 3,000 cons. Another factor needed co be disposed
of are the AP and AT mines as part of the Onawa
Treaty obligation (5,000 tons). Although progress in
the explosive ordinance area is viral, real time activity has been exceptional . There is clearly a need for
further support in the conti nued validation ofEOD
activity, in particular Hot Spot Clearance Procedures.
T he ream is aware that some information has been
lost in the translation and inrerprerarion process. T he
training for further EOD operacors will enable the
Albanians co enhance current disposal operations,
address the ongoing requirement co train EOD operators and co develop and implement a process to
identify, select and train Albanian personnel as EOD
trainers.

possess a credible counrer-IEDD capability. An extension co the capability of the AAF EOD organ ization would be considered a logical enhancement. The
ammunition stockpile requires a 100 percent survei llance program co ascertain serviceabil ity. The AAF
will require further traini ng in this function. Anumber of bad handling and sto rage practices which are
intrinsically unsafe have been identified an d an initial course held in December 1999 will be supplemented by a depot-by-depot program of active risk
limitation measures.

Conclusions
Both the EODASSTT and UNDP Weapons
Collections missions have proved extremely successful on a number of levels. In Albania they are seen as
both a practical and symbolic indicator char the country is stabilizing and addressing fundamental security
and safety issues. NATO has seen a vindication of irs
concept of the Individual Partnership Program withi n
PfP believing success in such a technically co mplex
area bodes well for address ing other specialise areas
with confidence. NATO has also seen its first seeps
cowards contracting military advisory casks to prove
successful with the hope char such future casks wi ll
not be forced co rely on the allocation of scarce military personnel resources from member nations. T he
UNDP approach has vi ndicated the view char rhe
collective responsibility and ownership engendered
thro ugh chis weapons collection program is the way
forward, and hopes to replicate the approach in Albania and elsewhere. •

Contact Information
MineClear International
Xerox Business Park
Mitcheldean,
Gloucesrershire
GL17 ODD
United Kingdom
Tel: +44-1594-545135
Fax: +44- 1594-54 5 10 1
Email:
mineclearops@exlogs.co.uk
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